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Frantz Fanon 
Philosophy, Praxis, and the Occult Zone 
Richard Pithouse 
Rhodes University 
In 2011, Achille Mbembe asserted that “the human has consistently taken on 
the form of waste within the peculiar trajectory race and capitalism 
espoused in South Africa.”1 He added that the end of apartheid had shifted 
rather than undone the lines of exclusion and dispute. Since the massacre on 
the platinum mines in 2012 it has become widely accepted that the state is 
resorting to repressive measures to enforce these lines and contain the 
dispute that they occasion. With notable exceptions academic philosophy, 
and theory more broadly, has offered remarkably little illumination of the 
widening distance between the promise of national liberation and 
democracy and the often bitter realities of contemporary South Africa. 
 
A Third Element 
Stathis Kouvelakis offers a compelling account of another moment in space 
and time in which a young intellectual sought rational hope, a material basis 
for political hope, against the melancholy of political disappointment.2 In 
1842 Karl Marx, a young man recently graduated with a PhD in Philosophy, 
was wrestling with the German failure to redeem the promise of the French 
Revolution which had heralded the arrival of modern nationalism and 
democracy in Europe. He quickly realised that making the world more 
philosophical would require that philosophy be made more worldly, that it 
take its place in the actual struggles in the world. He saw that the state and 
capital both tended towards a repression of the political and, looking for 
what he called 'a third element', a constituent power, he first turned to the 
press arguing that the “free press is the ubiquitous vigilant eye of a people's 
soul...the spiritual mirror in which a people can see itself, and self-
examination is the first condition of wisdom.”3 Marx hoped that “an 
association of free human beings who educate one another”4 in an 
expanding public sphere could subordinate the state to rational, public 
discussion in a process of ongoing democratisation. But when, in the 
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following year, the newspaper that he edited was banned Marx turned 
towards “suffering human beings who think”5 and to the hope that “making 
participation in politics, and therefore real struggles, the starting point of 
our criticism”6 could provide new grounds for commitment to democracy as 
a process of democratisation.  
The philosophical dogma of the day, which is often the dogma of our 
own time, a dogma that takes on a particular virulence in the context of 
racism, had argued that as a large mass of people sank into poverty they 
would become a rabble, a threat to society. But Marx insisted that “only one 
thing is characteristic, namely that lack of property and the estate of direct 
labour...form not so much an estate of civil society as the ground 7upon 
which its circles rest and move.”8 Marx, always refusing to hold up abstract 
ideas of an alternative society to which actually existing struggles should 
conform, looked to the real movement of the working class - the male 
working class of parts of Western Europe - for principles to orientate future 
struggle and the material force to be able to realise them.9 True to his turn to 
a philosophy of immanence he insisted that theory, philosophy, can become 
a material force when it is formulated from the perspective of the oppressed 
and becomes part of their constituent movement but for this to happen it 
must be radical because “To be radical is to grasp things by the root. But for 
man, the root is man himself.”10 Marx would go on, Raya Dunayevskaya 
argued, to “meet, theoretically, the workers’ resistance inside the factory and 
outside of it….Marx, the theoretician, created new categories out of the 
impulses from the workers.”11 
Today the basic elements of the problematic worked through by Marx 
continue to confront any attempt to think through the failure of national 
liberation or liberal democracy to realise their promise. Is it realistic to aim 
to transcend the impasse of the present via the pure exercise of reason when 
both the state and capital tend towards an anti-political tendency to reduce 
the sphere of public reason? Or must reason be meshed with the material 
force constituted by those that suffer and think so that the sphere of public 
reason can be expanded? Of course in South Africa, as in, say, Boliva12 or 
Haiti13, Marx’s youthful ideas need to be expanded – stretched in Frantz 
Fanon’s famous formulation - to take full measure of the enduring salience 
of colonialism and the manner in which the forces of containment also 
include both imperialism and enduring nodes of white power, or power 
racialized as closer to white than the population as a whole, within the 
nation state. 
 
Fracturing Hegemony 
In South Africa in 2015 there is a growing sense that neither the promise of 
national liberation or democracy has been redeemed. The organisational and 
ideological hegemony of the African National Congress (ANC) is rapidly 
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fracturing. A decade ago the shack settlement and the urban land occupation 
started to become sites of acute political intensity across the country. In 
Durban this led to the emergence of sustained popular organisation outside 
of the ANC by Abahlali baseMjondolo. More recently the National Union of 
Mineworkers (NUM) was largely displaced from the platinum mines, 
initially via workers’ self-organisation, and later via The Association of 
Mineworkers and Construction Union (AMCU). The National Union of 
Metalworkers of South Africa (NUMSA), the largest trade union in the 
country, has split with the ANC. On the electoral terrain the Economic 
Freedom Fighters (EFF), a populist breakaway from the ANC, have made a 
bold entry into parliament. In recent months, students, beginning at the 
University of Cape Town (UCT), have, acting outside of the organisational 
reach of the ANC, taken decisive steps to confront the enduring coloniality 
of universities. 
Ten years after apartheid Grant Farred wrote of 
the ‘zone of the not-yet political’ where the not-yet counterpartisan 
operates—the only place from which the current nomos can be 
critically undone, the only space from which a new nomos of the 
South African earth can be thought, the only concatenation of 
historical forces that can produce a new orientation of the 
political.14 
Today the constituent power of the new counterpartisan is still placed under 
the sign of the enemy, of white power, domestic or foreign, by power 
constituted via the state. But the actor for which Farred was waiting is now 
indisputably present – and subject to assassination in the shanty towns of 
Durban, lethal police action against street protests around the country and 
police massacre on the mines in the North West.  
In 2010 Pumla Gqola anticipated the possibilities for “politically 
inflected creative innovation”15 among the young. In 2015 there is no doubt 
that this moment has also arrived. There is a youthful ferment, in and out of 
universities, marked by a rapid break among young intellectuals, broadly 
conceived, not only with the intellectual and organizational authority of the 
ANC, as well as other sources of authority, including that of the academy, 
but also with the nature of the post-apartheid deal. As with previous 
moments of youthful rupture at various points during the twentieth century 
there is an international dimension to the current ferment. It has often taken 
on aspects of the language and some of the concerns of the Black Lives 
Matter movement in the United States. There are some connections, at time 
fruitful, between university students and other young middle class 
intellectuals with popular struggles in South Africa but these connections 
are not generally present in a sustained and serious way. In some cases 
affirmations of broader solidarity in the abstract are accompanied by a 
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striking lack of concern with the concrete situations and struggles of 
impoverished people in South Africa. 
A writer as astute as Sisonke Msimang16 has heralded this ferment 
among young intellectuals in terms that suggest, to play a little with a line 
from Aimé Césaire, a bright bird in flight through the stagnant air.17  Others 
have seen only the evidence of the morbid symptoms that, in Gramsci’s 
famous phrase, are characteristic of the interregnum. This pessimism has 
extended beyond the sort of leftism, often but not always white, that sees 
any discourse that extends beyond a narrowly conceived concern with class 
as ultimately reactionary. If there is a poem of the moment it would, by 
virtue of how often it has been invoked, be Yeat’s Second Coming.18 I have 
argued elsewhere that the liberal consensus is breaking down19 and that in 
order to make adequate sense of this conjuncture reason must unshackle 
itself from liberalism.20 This is not solely a matter of moving from the 
affirmation of abstract rights to real entitlements, or extending the domain of 
public disputation and state or popular power into the domain currently 
monopolised as a site of private power via the market. Liberalism, still 
rooted in the idea that “Despotism is a legitimate mode of government in 
dealing with barbarians”21, has always been organised around a distinction 
between the sacred and the profane22, sometimes spatialized and always 
racialized, in which, in the words of John Locke equality, far from being a 
universal principle, applies only to “creatures of the same species and 
rank.”23 Liberalism cannot be disentangled from racism – that requires an 
affirmation of equality as a universal principle. 
 
Summoning Fanon 
The militant figure of the contemporary South African moment is clearly 
Steve Biko and the most significant thinker of the moment is, without a 
doubt, Frantz Fanon. His books, together with those of Biko and, also, 
Mbembe, are among the most frequently stolen titles in bookshops.24 His 
name is appended to all kinds of projects and positions. From the urban land 
occupation, to the opinion pages of the newspapers, the university and 
parliament Fanon’s name has, as Mabogo More has noted, attained an 
extraordinary presence in South Africa.25 This phenomenon is 
overwhelmingly, although not exclusively, constituted via intellectual and 
political practices which take place outside of the academy. 
Fanon’s name has become so ubiquitous in the public sphere that it is 
not unusual for both protagonists in a debate, even when neither of them are 
taking a recognisably Fanonian position, to buttress their positions with 
references to Fanon. Even the bellicose former head of the police, Bheki Cele, 
has cited Fanon26 and his name is increasingly joining those of figures like 
Marx and Lenin in the statements of politicians.  
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Fanon’s name is frequently mobilised as if it carried the kind of 
authority, sometimes theological or prophetic rather than philosophical or 
political, that can be deployed to end rather than to enrich a debate. It is 
used to authorise all kinds of positions and power. In some instances, the 
ideas attributed to Fanon cannot be sustained by even a cursory reading of 
his texts, or a basic familiarity with his biography. But there are also many 
young people reading Biko and Fanon, and learning about their lives as 
thinkers committed to action, with real seriousness. There have been 
extraordinary public intellectual contributions from brilliant young people.   
Like the young Marx, Fanon poses the free flow of ideas against the 
degeneration of democratic promise and insists that the living human being 
rather than an abstract ideal, be it philosophical or statistical, be the measure 
of society. But the South African crisis is not solely a matter of the inability 
of a set of liberal political arrangements to redeem their democratic promise 
in so far as the working class continues to be exploited. The often very crude 
forms of Marxism present in South Africa never developed an adequate 
understanding of the salience of race27 and, today, are not always well 
equipped to take on board the reality that, as Mbembe notes, “a rising 
superfluous population is becoming a permanent fixture of the South 
African social landscape with little possibility of ever being exploited by 
capital. Only a dwindling number of individuals can now claim to be 
workers in the traditional sense of the term.”28 South Africa is a colonial 
creation that has not fully escaped the iron cage in which it was born. In 
2015 it is simultaneously colony and postcolony and this reality is central to 
the appeal of Fanon, a thinker who theorised the pathologies of both the 
colony and the postcolony. 
 
Affirmation & Critique 
There is an aspect of the current moment that has a certain resonance with 
Walter Benjamin’s 9th thesis on history.  Benjamin, as is well known, offers 
an image of the angel of history with his face turned to the past.  He writes 
that “Where we perceive a chain of events, he sees one single catastrophe 
which keeps pilling wreckage upon wreckage and hurls it in front of his feet. 
The angel would like to stay, awaken the dead, and make whole what has 
been smashed.” But the storm blowing in from Paradise, the storm of 
‘progress’, propels him into the future “while the pile of debris before him 
grows skywards.”29 
In and around the South African academy in 2015 the desire on the part 
of young intellectuals to anoint and awaken their own dead, is evidently 
motivated by a commitment to a fuller and freer presence in the here and 
now. This should not surprise us. After all Fanon was clear that it was, 
precisely, the inherited weight of racist culture that crushed his desire to 
R i c h a r d  P i t h o u s e  |  1 2 1  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XXIV, No 1 (2016)  |  http://www.jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2016.761 
“come lithe and young into a world that was ours and to help build it 
together.”30 
The imperative to affirm a body of thought and a history of action that 
has been silenced and denigrated is not solely present amid the structural 
racism that characterises the South African academy. It remains the case that 
in the commanding heights of the global academy “(t)he discourse which 
witnesses to Africa’s knowledge” often continues to take “geographical or 
anthropological”31  forms; that the process of “speaking rationally about 
Africa” continues to encounter systematic difficulties and that “the African 
human experience constantly appears in the discourse of our times as an 
experience that can only be understood through a negative interpretation.”32   
However the requirements of an emancipatory engagement with the 
philosophical dimensions of political thought clearly exceed the necessity to 
affirm an archive of Black, Southern and African thought against the colonial 
archive. In the South African universities that are in the process of 
subordinating themselves to the state and the ruling party, the affirmation of 
the African archive, is, in some instances, marked by what Paulin 
Hountondji, in his scathing critique of ethnophilosophy, described as a 
“crass indifference to the daily tragedies of our increasingly Fascistic 
countries.”33 There is also a degree to which state power, often repressive 
and predatory, seeks to cloak itself in this body of thought with the result 
that it becomes, to stay with Hountondji, part of the “machine that is 
mounted against our consciences.”34 “a discourse of power” and “an 
ideological placebo.”35  
The limits to the affirmation of the African archive exceed the risks of its 
absorption into the ideological machinery of constituted power. The world is 
in constant motion and the human, is frequently, as Fanon asserts, “motion 
toward the world”36 and always capable of what he termed, throughout his 
life as a writer, ‘mutation’.  In the domain of the political the urgency of the 
imperative to think the new, to develop an orientation towards the future - 
what Mbembe calls “a radical future orientated politics in this world and 
these times”37 – an orientation in thought and practice that aims to transcend 
rather than deny or accept the realities of the present is undeniable. As Alain 
Badiou has insisted: 
A political situation is always singular; it is never repeated. 
Therefore political writings – directives or commands – are justified 
inasmuch as they inscribe not a repetition but, on the contrary, the 
unrepeatable. When the content of a political statement is a 
repetition the statement is rhetorical and empty. It does not form 
part of thinking. On this basis one can distinguish between true 
political activists and politicians...True political activists think a 
singular situation; politicians do not think.38  
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Although the power of capital over land, labour and society has grown 
considerably stronger since Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels announced its 
arrival as a force on the global stage its icy waters have not washed away all 
modes of domination and exclusion other than “that single, unconscionable 
freedom — Free Trade”39. On the contrary capital has continued to operate 
differently in different spaces and with regard to different people. In South 
Africa the intersection of race and capitalism continues to generate lines of 
exclusion, domination, exploitation and dehumanization – as well as 
compromise and incorporation - that exceed those that are sometimes taken 
to emerge as generic features of life under capitalism. Here - as in the Congo, 
or Mexico or India – critiques of contemporary capitalism, and the forms of 
political containment and contestation associated with it, developed in 
response to realities in the North Atlantic world are often useful, and 
sometimes invaluable, but seldom, if ever, definitive. The dependence of 
many intellectuals in and around the academy on concepts uncritically 
imported from Western Europe and North America has not been fruitful 
and is one part of the explanation for the general alienation of academic 
radicalism from popular struggles, and the ideas developed in these 
struggles.  
 
Philosophy as Praxis 
There is an urgent need to think our own situation in space, and in race, as 
well as in time – along with, of course, the gendered nature of the social 
relations that are emerging in the current conjuncture. At the end of his first 
book Fanon declares his willingness to “undertake the possibility of 
annihilation in order that two or three truths may cast their eternal brilliance 
over the world.”40  It is certainly possible to read this declaration, perhaps in 
conversation with Badiou,41 as an eminently philosophical militancy. He 
concludes his last book by insisting that “we must work out new 
concepts.”42  This statement, perhaps this time in conversation with Gilles 
Deleuze and Félix Guattari,43 can be read in similar terms.   
When the necessity for political thought, including in its philosophical 
dimensions, to take the particularity of specific situations seriously is itself 
taken seriously it also becomes necessary to think seriously about the ways 
in which the concept, in some accounts the central feature of philosophical 
thought, “has a becoming that involves its relationship with concepts 
situated on the same plane.”44  It is well known that there is often a 
generational aspect to the production of new concepts, and new sets of 
concepts. But for Fanon while the development of radical reason, which is to 
say emancipatory reason, which is, in turn, to say universal reason, certainly 
includes conversation with philosophy as it is defined by Hountondji,45 the 
plane of becoming on which this work constitutes itself is that of struggle – 
the struggles of the dammed of the earth. 
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A conception of philosophy that departs from the understanding that, 
to return to Benjamin, “the ‘state of emergency’ in which we live is not the 
exception but the rule” and that, “it is our task to bring about a real state of 
emergency”46 requires not just awaking the dead so that they can become 
totems in the present but, also, bringing their work into a new conversation 
that, fully cognisant of the accumulation of catastrophe, is willing to 
confront the approaching storm. In the Fanonian paradigm the most 
significant location for this work is within the struggles of the oppressed. 
This is the work of praxis47, of what Antonio Gramsci termed the “common 
work of clarification” and “reciprocal education” or, in more explicitly 
partisan terms, “communist practice: discussion in common….to arrive 
together at the truth.”48 What Gramsci called the philosophy of praxis is 
complex terrain but at its heart, ethically and epistemologically, is the idea of 
reciprocity – pithily summed by Gramsci as follows: “every teacher is 
always a pupil and every pupil a teacher.”49 It affirms what we could, 
following Jacques Rancière, conceivably call a “communism of intelligence.” 
50 It has a certain resonance, as both an ethical axiom and a political strategy, 
to the idea that, in Badiou’s formulation: “Wherever a human collective is 
working in the direction of equality, the conditions are met for everyone to 
be a philosopher.”51 In this respect it is fundamentally at odds with the 
reading of Lenin, common to both Stalinist and some currents of Trotskyist 
thought in South Africa, in which “a Leninist party is in essence a radical 
intelligentsia that says we have the right to rule.”52 
The turn to Fanon in contemporary South Africa has largely been 
animated by energies outside the academy. But the attempt to think through 
this moment from within the academy doesn’t require an entirely new 
return to Fanon’s texts. In 1996 Ato Sekyi-Otu began his brilliant new 
reading of The Damned of the Earth by announcing that “The time has indeed 
come to remember Fanon.”53 For Sekyi-Otu the urgency of the injunction to 
remember Fanon included an imperative to address new questions to old 
texts, questions appropriate to new locations in space and time. He was 
centrally concerned with what he termed ‘the postcolonial condition’ - a 
morass of suffering emerging at the intersection of the power of predatory 
and authoritarian nationalist elites with that of foreign overlords – and, in 
particular,  its meaning for the new democracy in South Africa.  
In many respects South Africa is following a well-worn path into the 
crisis of the postcolony or the postcolonial condition. This lends a certain 
urgency to Skeyi-Otu’s work as what he calls “a postindependence 
reader.”54 But, like Zimbabwe a decade ago, the crisis is characterised by the 
simultaneous presence of enduring colonial features and the pathologies of 
the postcolony. The evident injustices of the former are often cynically 
misused to legitimate the active exploitation of the latter which, in turn, are, 
with equal cynicism, mobilised against demands for the state to enforce 
justice with regard to the former. One result of this situation is that critique 
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that does not simultaneously address the pathologies of both the colony and 
the postcolony risks inadvertent complicity with that towards which it 
sustains silence. In South Africa in 2015 we also have to read Fanon with his 
interlocutors from societies that, like the United States, retain colonial 
features. 
Twenty years earlier Hountondji, in a book that, like Sekyi-Otu’s signal 
contribution, was grounded in an “insistence on the [philosophical] right to 
the universal”55 had lamented an increasing normalisation of outright 
repression accompanied by modes of politics and ideology committed to 
“poisoning genuine thought at its source.”56  Like Sekyi-Otu Hountondji was 
centrally concerned with the prospect of reason as an emancipatory force 
and with disentangling reason from its long enmeshment with racism. But 
while Hountondji affirmed reason as philosophy in the sense of an 
engagement with a history of thought rather than a mode of thought Sekyi-
Otu, writing in scrupulous fidelity to Fanon’s texts, and in conversation with 
Gramsci’s philosophy of praxis,57 affirmed radical reason as, in his revised 
translation of Fanon’s words, “knowledge through praxis.”58 Similar 
readings are evident in the work of people like Lewis Gordon59 and Nigel 
Gibson.60 
 
Reason & the Ontological Split 
Racism, as ideology, is organised around the assertion that humanity is 
riven by an ontological split. In the consciousness of the racist, and in the 
general intellect of racist social formations, this ontological split is taken as 
part of what Immanuel Kant called the a priori, the categories through which 
sense is made of experience.61 This deception of reason, this “racist 
rationality”62 results in racist societies producing forms of knowledge that, 
while authorised as the most fully formed instances of reason at work, are 
fundamentally irrational.  
In The “North African Syndrome”, an essay first published in 1952, Frantz 
Fanon wrote that in the French medical establishment: 
(T)he attitude of medical personnel is very often an a priori attitude. 
The North African does not come with a substratum common to his 
race, but on a foundation built by the European. In other words, the 
North Africa, spontaneously, by the very fact of appearing in the 
scene, enters into a pre-existing framework.63 
In other words medical science in colonial France allowed a priori ontological 
assumptions to prevent it from making rational sense of experience.  
In Black Skin, White Masks, published in the same year, Fanon also offers 
a critique of philosophy in colonial France. He insists that the lived 
experience of the black person is not congruent with any (philosophically 
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orthodox) “ontological explanation” because “The black man has no 
ontological resistance in the eyes of the white man.”64 Fanon stresses that 
racism is not only unreasonable but that it structures the a priori categories 
through which experience is mediated in a manner that makes it impossible 
to recognise reason expressed from black embodiment as reason: “[W]hen I 
was present, it was not; when it was there, I was no longer.”65  
The inability to recognise black reason as reason produces an inability 
to recognise black political agency – a distortion of reality all too evident in 
both historiography and contemporary attempts to think the political. In his 
discussion of the evident fact that, in the colonial imagination, the Haitian 
Revolution “entered history with the peculiar characteristic of being 
unthinkable as it happened” Michel-Rolph Trouillot writes that: 
the contention that enslaved Africans and their descendants could 
not envision freedom – let alone formulate strategies for gaining 
and securing such freedom – was based not so much on empirical 
evidence as on an ontology, an implicit organization of the world 
and its inhabitants.66 
He goes on to show that racist ontology continued to structure the 
historiography of the Haitian Revolution for the next two centuries. 
Lewis Gordon, riffing off Fanon as well as W.E.B. du Bois, uses the idea 
of illicit appearance to theorise the absence “of the right of appearance” 
beyond the right to appear as reasonable resulting in invisibility and 
hypervisibility – “the effect of which is the erasure of individuating or 
contextualizing considerations - that is, human invisibility.”67 “When you 
come down to it” Fanon wrote in The North African Syndrome, “the North 
African is a simulator, a liar, a malingerer, a sluggard, a thief.”68 
Lewis and Jane Anna Gordon, writing together, argue that across space 
and time elites generally assume that the system in which they have 
prospered is ultimately good and that the people that disrupt its smooth 
functioning must be problem people – even monsters. Gordon and Gordon 
point out that in anti-black societies, black people are rendered monstrous 
“when they attempt to live and participate in the wider civil society and 
engage in processes of governing among whites...Their presence in society 
generally constitutes crime.”69  
Fanon begins the pivotal fifth chapter of Black Skin, White Masks with the 
cauterisation of an affirmation of a desire for sociality: ““I came into the 
world imbued with the will to find a meaning in things, my spirit filled with 
the desire to attain to the source of the world, and then I found that I was an 
object in the midst of other objects.”70 The chapter concludes with the defeat 
of all attempts to attain recognition in a racist world: “I wanted to rise, but 
the disemboweled silence fell back upon me, its wings paralyzed. Without 
responsibility, straddling Nothingness and Infinity, I began to weep.”71  
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His response to the impossibility of a dialectic of recognition72 is not to 
give up on the aspiration for a world of mutuality, of universal humanism 
(predicated on a universal ontology) – he still aspires to a world that will 
recognise “the open door of every consciousness”73 - but to accept that he 
has found himself in a world “in which I am summoned into battle”74 and to 
commit to action: “To educate man to be actional, preserving in all his 
relations his respect for the basic values that constitute a human world, is 
the prime task of him who, having taken thought, prepares to act.”75 In 
Gordon’s estimation the Fanonian position is that “Legitimacy doesn’t 
emerge from the proof of cultural heritage or racial authenticity, it 
emerges…[Fanon] argues, from active engagement in struggles for social 
transformation and building institutions and ideas that nourish and liberate 
the formerly colonized.”76 
This commitment to praxis is a politics that, in Gordon’s formulation, 
requires a commitment to “meeting people on the terrain where they live”77 
with a view to forging what, as noted above, Mbembe calls “a radical future 
orientated politics in this world and these times.”78  Such a politics, it is 
asserted here, must be grounded in what S’bu Zikode first called a ‘living 
politics’79 and what Lewis Gordon calls ‘living thought’ or ‘thinking as a 
living activity’.80 It requires a decisive break with the idea, all too frequently 
present in South Africa, that radical politics is fundamentally a matter of 
rallying ‘the masses’ to the authority of a group of people who, whether 
situated in a party, a proto-party or an NGO, imagine themselves to be an 
enlightened vanguard.  
This is not the apocalyptic politics that, as is sometimes the case in Aimé 
Césaire’s work, is more concerned with eschatology than praxis. In the 
Notebook of Return to my Native Land Césaire, in a manner that in some 
respects anticipates some currents in contemporary Afro-pessimism, affirms 
that the only thing work starting is “The end of the world!”81 and anticipates 
the one glorious moment82, the brilliant new dawn in which “the volcanoes 
will break out and the naked water will sweep away the ripe stains of the 
sun and nothing will remain but a tepid bubbling pecked at by sea birds – 
the beach of dreams, and demented awakening”83, a rising of a new sun that 
would “burst open the life of the shacks like an over-ripe pomegranate.”84 In 
this vision, in which the political is sublimated into the theological, the 
authentic radical gesture is, ultimately, to disavow the world as it is and to 
wait for the birth of a new world. 
Again unlike Césaire Fanon does not accept the ontological split 
introduced into the conception of humanity authorised by colonial racism. 
His evident commitment to the universal85, and action to affirm a universal 
humanism86, situates him in a line of black radical thought that runs from 
Toussaint Louverture87 to Biko88, Jean-Bertrand Aristide89 and, arguably for 
that matter, the constant insistence on the barricades on South African 
streets of words to the effect of ‘we are human not animal’.90 
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But like Césaire Fanon’s radical vision is not, at all, a commitment to 
what Césaire, writing in 1956, termed ‘abstract equality’. Césaire remarks 
that: 
To prevent the development of all national consciousness in the 
colonized, the colonizer pushes the colonized to desire an abstract 
equality. But equality refuses to remain abstract. And what an 
affair it is when the colonized takes back the word on his own 
account to demand that it not remain a mere word!'91 
From a South African perspective this condemnation of ‘abstract equality’ 
sounds almost prophetic but it has always been a colonial response to black 
insurgency. In in 1801 Napolean wrote, from St Helena, of the French policy, 
with regard to Haiti, of “disarming the blacks while assuring them of their 
civil liberty, and restoring property to the [white] colonists.”92 
For Fanon emancipation has many aspects. These include a spatial 
aspect,93 a material aspect,94 the attainment of equality between women and 
men,95 but, also, and fundamentally, the sovereignty of the human person. 
Liberation must, he insists, in Sekyi-Otu’s revised translation, "give back 
their dignity to all citizens, fill their minds and feast their eyes with human 
things and create a prospect that is human because conscious and sovereign 
persons dwell therein.”96 In contemporary South Africa this cannot take the 
form of the sole defence of abstract rights, a politics primarily organised 
around exploitation via the wage relation or the sort of nationalism that is 
naïve about the cleavages with the nation. It must to, to return to Mbembe, 
“take the form of a conscious attempt to retrieve life and ‘the human’ from a 
history of waste.”97 
 
Praxis as Return 
Praxis is not, at all, a new idea in South Africa. From the early 1970s until the 
end of apartheid, ordinary people became central protagonists in the 
struggles against apartheid. Schools, churches, urban land occupations, 
mines, factories and other sites of habitation, labour, education, spiritual 
communion and sociality become sites of intense struggle.  
The first moment in the sequence of struggle that began in the 1970s, 
and is either understood to have been concluded or temporarily interrupted 
in 1994, is that of the Black Consciousness Movement that attained its first 
flowering in Durban in the early 1970s. The proper name that has come to be 
assigned to this current of struggle, which began in the universities, among 
students, as a project with an explicitly intellectual dimension, is that of 
Steve Biko, murdered in 1977. The intellectual resources that were central to 
its founding moment included Aimé Césaire, James Cone, Frantz Fanon and 
Jean-Paul Sartre along with various protagonists in the black power 
movement in the United States.98 When it sought to reach out into the wider 
1 2 8  |  F r a n t z  F a n o n  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XXIV, No 1 (2016)  |  http://www.jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2016.761 
community Paulo Freire – who insisted that “When people are already 
dehumanized, due to the oppression they suffer, the process of their 
liberation must not employ the methods of dehumanization”99 - was taken 
as a key thinker to guide the work of praxis.100 The Black Consciousness 
Movement organised independently of the ANC and, beginning with a rally 
organised in Durban in 1974 in support of Frelimo and reaching a high point 
following the high school students revolt that began in Soweto in 1976, 
displaced much of the hegemony that the ANC had exercised over the 
struggles against apartheid since the 1950s. But by the late 1980s the politics 
of the Black Consciousness Movement had ossified,101 it had intersected with 
a dogmatic form of Trotskyism that often functioned to contain rather than 
facilitate the exchange of ideas, it was marginal and under attack from the 
broader movement aligned to the ANC as well as the state. 
The trade union struggles, with their immediate roots in the Durban 
strikes of 1973, emerged in the encounter between radicals in the university, 
academics and students, and workers. As is always the case both 
protagonists in this encounter brought ideas and practices into the 
movement that they built together. Richard Turner, assassinated in 1978, 
was the leading figure in the university side of the initial stages of this 
encounter. Turner was fundamentally a Sartrean, but Freire was also an 
important thinker in this moment and the idea of praxis was taken very 
seriously. Later on Western Marxism more broadly, including Gramsci, 
became central102 although some people also moved towards Trotskyism. 
The trade union movement sustained independent mass based democratic 
organisation until its co-option by both the ANC and capital in the 1990s. 
The community struggles that came to the fore after the formation of the 
United Democratic Front in Cape Town in 1983, were also broadly 
committed to radically democratic practices although this declined as 
repression wore on in the second half of the 1980s and did not always extend 
to people organised outside of the ANC. In this case there is no particular 
intellectual or theory associated with this sequence of struggle but ideas 
about praxis, sometimes drawn from Friere, were certainly central and 
ordinary people certainly became political protagonists. 
After apartheid, as had happened throughout the colonised world, the 
people were, to borrow a phrase from Fanon, “sent back to their caves.”103 
The bulk of the radical intelligentsia entered the party, the state or civil 
society, which came to be largely constituted by NGOs rather than popular 
organisations. The radical imagination within the ANC and its allies was 
largely subordinated to the SACP and its version of Marxist-Leninism. This 
was a resolutely statist conception of politics that was hostile to any 
independent organisation and, in the name of the national democratic 
revolution, frequently demanded obedience to the ruling party in the here 
and now in the name of a socialist future to come at some indeterminate 
point in the future. In the NGO milieu a different form of statism came to 
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dominate as liberal ideas, characterised, at first, by a profound naivety about 
lobbying the state on policy questions and, later, about recourse to the courts 
to achieve social justice, became largely hegemonic. The significant dissident 
current in the NGO milieu was largely Trotskyist. Its attempts to mobilise 
people behind its conceptions of what politics should be have not met with 
any significant success in the current cycle of popular protest. 
But the limits of the left strung between the academy and the NGO 
exceed the evident fact of its consistent failure to win support or to organise 
effectively. In contemporary South Africa the political agency of the urban 
poor is frequently read in terms of external conspiracy, criminality or some 
sort of intersection between ignorance and thuggery across a range of sites 
of elite power. It is an undeniable fact that the left in the academy and in 
NGOs has often reinscribed this. This phenomenon is not unique to South 
Africa. Peter Hallward has pointed to a very similar experience in Haiti104 
and Raúl Zibechi has done the same with regard to Latin America.105 
The basic outline of Fanon’s thinking about praxis is clear enough. 
Fanon is, in Ranciére’s terms, resolutely anti-Platonic. There is never an idea, 
common to some forms of thought that claim to derive from Lenin, civil 
society and elite nationalism as well as technocratic modes of authority, that 
the work of political thought is that of a particular caste of intellectuals. And 
contrary to much of the Marxist tradition there is no specific subaltern group 
that is held to have a particular claim to emancipatory reason. Fanon does 
not turn sociology into ontology and is open to the prospect of the rural 
peasantry or the urban poor emerging as political actors of weight and 
consequence. His commitment, as principle and practice, to ‘recognize the 
open door of every consciousness’ is a point of departure for praxis as well 
as an aspiration for a just society.  
In the context of his medical work he writes, in Black Skin, White Masks 
that: 
Examining this seventy three year old farm woman, whose mind 
was never strong and who is now far gone in dementia, I am 
suddenly aware of the collapse of the antennae with which I touch 
and through which I am touched. The fact that I adopt a language 
suitable to dementia, to feeble-mindedness; the fact that I ‘talk  
down’ to this poor woman of seventy-three; the fact that I 
condescend to her in my quest for a diagnosis, are the stigmata of a 
dereliction in my relations with other.106 
The commitment to mutuality is sustained in the political context where he 
is committed, like Gramsci before him, and Freire after him, to a 
fundamentally dialogical model of engagement. This is strikingly different 
to some of the contemporary discourse around ‘privilege’ which is 
predicated on a commitment, at times implicit, to an ontological fixity. 
Fanon does not disavow the weight of history, economy or culture but he 
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does take the view that no particular type of actor is contained in a 
“crushing objecthood”107 that makes ‘mutation’ impossible. This includes 
not just the subaltern subject whose mode of life and capacity for motion, 
which is to say change and agency, remain largely hidden from elites.108 As 
Gibson explains in Fanon’s view “Nationalists, even those on the left, 
[frequently but not inevitably] continue to define the rural masses in colonial 
terms”109 yet Fanon never reifies this view and consistently affirms the 
possibility of the dissident intellectual. 
For Fanon the transcendence of the ontological split introduced by 
colonialism is something to be worked out, in practice, which requires, as a 
starting point, the acknowledgment of alienation. He writes in Sekyi-Otu’s 
revised translation, that the native intellectual has an historic “inaptitude to 
engage in dialogue; for he does not know how to make himself inessential in 
the face of the object or an idea"110 and must overcome the inability to “carry 
on a two-sided discussion”111. Fanon warns against any attempts “erect a 
framework around the people that follows an a priori schedule”112 and 
intellectuals deciding to “come down into the common paths of real life” 
with formulas that are “sterile in the extreme.”113 His position in this regard 
has clear resonances with Gramsci’s assertion that “the philosopher …. not 
only grasps the contradictions, but posits himself (sic) as an element of the 
contradiction and elevates this element to a principle of knowledge and 
therefore action.”114   
But, as Sekyi-Otu writes, Fanon identifies a second danger, a second 
barrier to the possibility of mutuality, that confronts the intellectual in the 
occult zone: 
Embarrassed by his erstwhile posture of subjective certainty, the 
native intellectual turned maquisard is now ready to disavow his 
claim to rational knowledge altogether: ‘The danger that will haunt 
him continually is that of embracing populism; he becomes a sort of 
yes-man who nods assent at every word coming from the people, 
which he interprets as considered judgments’. Fanon does not 
endorse this romance of the people and, with it, the guilt-ridden 
renunciation of reason.115 
Praxis is an affirmation of the universal capacity for reason, and not a denial 
of reason in favour of the assertion of a Manicheanism to counter that of 
colonialism. It is not a simple matter of, in a single moment of Damascene 
clarity, taking the side of the oppressed. The process that enables what 
Sekyi-Otu refers to as the “reprieve of prodigal reason”116 is a world apart 
from the hope of a moment of apocalyptic redemption, arriving like a thief 
in the night, evident in Césaire. On the contrary for Fanon "the idyllic and 
unreal clarity of the beginning is followed by a semi-darkness that bewilders 
consciousness”:117 
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In their weary road toward rational knowledge the people must 
also give up their too-simple conception of their overlords. The 
species is breaking up under their very eyes. As they look around 
them, they notice that certain settlers do not join in the general 
guilty hysteria; there are differences in the same species. . . The 
scandal explodes when the prototypes of this division of the species 
go over to the enemy, become blacks or Arabs, and accept 
suffering, torture, and death.118 
For Fanon the possibilities of mutually transformative dialogue and 
collaboration on the terrain of equality can only be realised on an enabling 
terrain. He takes the view that the militant intellectual must commit to 
presence in the real movements that abolish the present state of things—to 
be present in the “zone of occult instability where the people dwell”119, in 
the “seething pot out of which the learning of the future will emerge”120 and, 
there, to “collaborate on the physical plane.”121  Working “inside the 
structure of the people”122 and “living inside history”123 is not possible in the 
absence of organization and struggle. The “inclusion of the intellectual in the 
upward surge of the masses”124 is only possible in the presence of an 
upward surge. So while political possibility is not ontologically determined 
it is historically constrained. 
But despite these cautions Fanon still heralds the possibility of “a 
mutual current of enlightenment and enrichment”125 that enables political 
education, which he frames in terms of an enlightening of consciousness, “as 
a new relationship between intellectual and the people”126 encouraging and 
equipping people to think for themselves. For Fanon this is a crucial step 
towards new modes of politics. In Sekyi-Otu’s reading: “To the radical 
intelligentsia, dissident members of the national bourgeoisie, Fanon assigns 
a crucial role in this work of fashioning what Césaire called a ‘common 
sense’ out of differing languages of existence.”127 
Fanon’s conception of praxis is directly opposed to what Jacques 
Rancière describes as the ‘stultification’ that is consequence to any situation 
where “one intelligence is subordinated to another.”128 It is, therefore, 
opposed to the sort of domination that Paulo Freire describes as 
“Manipulation, sloganizing, ‘depositing’, regimentation, and prescription”129 
and which is common in NGO based civil society, party politics and small 
sectarian groups in contemporary South Africa.130 Now that Fanon has 
arrived as the philosopher of the moment, a moment in which there has 
been open defiance in shack settlements, on mines, and in universities, it 
may well be worth reading him as a thinker who does not just remain timely 
as a result of a failure to attain social progress but who could also be a 
philosopher of movement. This would require that Fanon be recognised as a 
thinker who prescribed a mode of praxis grounded in a commitment to the 
emancipation of reason from the strictures of colonial ontologies rather than, 
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as he is often read, solely as a thinker who offered a compelling diagnosis of 
the pathologies of both the colony and the postcolony. 
 
Conclusion 
It could be argued that the centering of Fanon in this moment speaks to a 
major limit of African philosophy and political theory more broadly – a 
failure to generate a compelling emancipatory vision in the fifty years after 
Fanon, and the sequence of struggle from within which he thought – that of 
national liberation. But Fanon did not think in isolation from popular 
struggle and it could well be that our inability to transcend Fanon is a 
consequence of the political failures of the last fifty years and, in particular, 
the failure to transcend the sequence of national liberation struggles which, 
in South Africa, is both unfinished and therefore still urgently legitimate and 
simultaneously, as in, say, Algeria or Zimbabwe, a nightmare weighing 
heavily on the brains of the living. 
In South Africa in 2015 intellectual life in the academy and the elite 
public sphere is overwhelmingly alienated from escalating popular 
struggles. Attempts to capture these struggles, whether framed in largely 
nationalist or socialist terms, are largely attempts to subordinate them to 
would-be vanguards rather than attempts to engage them on the basis of 
equality. Our inability to transcend Fanon is, this contribution suggests, 
largely due to our failure to take Fanon seriously. If we wish to go beyond 
Fanon we need to begin by taking him seriously and shifting the ground of 
reason from the university, the NGO, the sectarian groupuscle or network or 
the rapid chatter of social media to the occult zone inhabited by “suffering 
human beings who think.” 
                                                                
 
This is a considerably revised version of a paper first presented at a workshop on African 
Thinking: And/At its Limits organised in the Africana Studies & Research Centre at Cornell in 
June 2015. My thanks to Grant Fared for the invitation, his careful comments and to all the 
participants for a rich discussion. 
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